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SECURITIES LAW - UNCOLLATERALIZED PROMISSORY 
NOTES ARE CONSIDERED "SECURITIES" TO BE 
REGULATED UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS. 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Often, amid the intricate passages of federal securities regula-
tion, I an important term or phrase escapes precise formulation. 2 
Undoubtedly, the definition of a security contained in the securities 
acts3 represents just such a passage. Before Reves v. Ernst & Young,4 
the Supreme Court had declined to address the issue of whether 
notesS are securities.6 This allowed federal circuit courts to create and 
1. In this casenote, "securities regulation" or the "securities acts" refer to both 
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) 
[hereinafter 1933 Act] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 78a-78kk (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 1934 Act], as well as the 
applicable rules and regulations of each Act. The term "security" refers to the 
investment instruments which are regulated by the Security Act of 1933 or the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
2. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 720 (1975) 
(securities laws are interpreted in a manner most conducive to the effectuation 
of the statute's goals); SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) 
(meaning of particular phrases in securities laws must be determined in context); 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (the 1934 Act is remedial 
legislation which should be broadly construed). 
3. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b(1) & 78c(a)(1O) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
4. Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd sub nom. 
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). 
5. For purposes of this casenote, the term "note" means an instrument commonly 
defined as a written promise to pay a specified amount to a certain entity 
either on demand or on a specified date. See J. DOWNES & J. GOODMAN, 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (1985). 
At common law, several cases attempted to define the term "note." See, 
e.g., Kirkland v. Bailey, 115 Ga. App. 726, 728, 155 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1967) 
("[t]he word 'note' is defined as a written paper acknowledging a debt and 
promising payment"); Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co. v. Brown, 141 So. 436, 
439 (La. 1932) ("A note is a written engagement or promise to pay a certain 
sum of money at a time specified. It is the evidence of an obligation to pay."). 
See also Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act 0/ 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act 0/ 1934, 36 MD. L. REv. 233, 236 n.13 (1976) 
[hereinafter, Comment, Notes as Securities]. 
6. See, e.g., Futura Dev. Co. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enters., 
Inc. 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Zeller v. 
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 
(1973). 
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apply their own tests to determine whether a note is a security subject 
to federal regulation. 7 A variety of tests emerged from the federal 
circuits leading the Supreme Court in Reves to attempt to define the 
scope of the term in the context of notes. 8 
In Reves, the Eighth Circuit determined that the demand prom-
issory notes in question were not securities because they lacked the 
characteristics of a security.9 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the demand notes were subject to federal securities regulation. 
The Court concluded that to hold otherwise would be inconsistent 
with congressional intent in enacting the securities laws. 1o 
In its decision, the Court not only established the test for 
determining whether a note instrument is a "security" under the 
securities acts, but it also found that the promissory demand note at 
issue did not fall within the exemption under federal securities laws ll 
7. Most federal courts agree that some notes definitely do not fall under securities 
regulation, such as notes securing home mortgages. On the other hand, notes 
issued as investments to the public in order to raise capital are usually held to 
be securities. Difficulty arises when attempting to develop a practical test for 
determining the status of notes that fall between these two obvious extremes. 
See Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities Under the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA. 
L. REv. 400, 403 (1982) [hereinafter Note, The Economic Realities of Defining 
Notes as Securities); see also Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene 
Security, A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEX. TECH L. REv. 
25, 26 (1975) (tests used by the courts to define whether a note is a security 
are subjective and impractical). See infra notes 37-66 and accompanying text 
for discussion of the various tests applied by the federal circuit courts of 
appeals. 
8. Prior to the Reves decision, no common test was employed by the circuits to 
determine whether a note instrument was a security. See infra notes 37-66 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the various tests applied. In order to 
avoid these problems, the Supreme Court applied a specific test in order to 
clarify what types of notes would not be considered to have the characteristics 
of securities. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text. 
9. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub 
nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). The Eighth Circuit applied 
the test developed in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (known 
as the Howey test) and found that the demand nature of the notes was "very 
uncharacteristic of a security." Id. Thus, the appellate court concluded that 
the notes were not securities within the meaning of either the federal or 
Arkansas securities laws. Id. at 54-55. 
10. Reves, 494 U.S. at 73. The application of the Howey test to notes was rejected 
by the Supreme Court, finding that the test was designed primarily for 
investment contracts and not notes. Id. at 64-67. 
11. In § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, "[a)ny note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers' 
acceptance ... which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding 
nine months" is exempted from the provisions of the Act. 15 U .S.C.A. § 
77c(a)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). However, in § 3(a)(IO) of the 1934 Act, 
"[t)he term 'security' ... shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of 
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for notes with a maturityl2 exceeding nine months at the time of 
issuance. Although the determination of what test to apply will create 
uniformity, this test, as well as the plurality'sl3 decision as to the 
maturity issue, creates more problems than it purports to resolve. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Securities Acts 
After the collapse of the stock market in 1929, Congress l4 enacted 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
to bolster investor confidence in the securities markets by providing 
federal protection against fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative 
practices, which were thought t6 have contributed to the collapse. IS 
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance 
of not exceeding nine months." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(lO) (West 1988 & Supp. 
1991). 
12. The term "maturity" refers to the date on which the principal amount of a 
debt instrument becomes due and payable. See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra 
note 5. 
13. Only four Justices (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Kennedy) joined in the 
determination that the maturity of the Co-op's demand notes was not immediate 
and, therefore, the notes were not excluded from regulation under the securities 
acts. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion on this issue. 
14. State regulation of securities predated the adoption of the federal securities 
acts. Kansas was the first to adopt state securities regulation in 1911, followed 
by Arizona and Louisiana in 1912. The constitutionality of state regulation of 
securities markets through the blue sky laws was established in Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). These state statutes are called "blue sky laws" 
due to the Kansas promoter who was selling "lots in the blue sky in fee simple 
absolute." See R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS, 334 (1989) 
(citing Mulvy, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37 (1916»; see also H. 
BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING, SECURITIES LAW, § 2.02 (1990-91) (fifty-one Amer-
ican jurisdictions require regulation of securities; the District of Columbia does 
not). 
15. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (Necessity for Regulation) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); 
S. REp. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER 
& E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 17 (1979); see also Randall v. 
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (aim of 1934 Act includes the deterrence 
of fraud and manipulative practices in securities markets and full disclosure of 
information material for investment decisions); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U.S. 551, 555 (1982) (1934 Act was adopted to restore investors' confidence); 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (1933 Act was designed 
to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning 
public offerings of securities to protect investors against fraud); Radzanower 
v~ Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (primary purpose of the 1934 
Act was to provide fair and honest mechanism for pricing of securities and to 
assure that dealing in securities was fair); United Housing Found., Inc. v. 
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Both statutes emphasize disclosure by issuers of information material 
to investors, but regulate different securities markets. 16 Exemptions 
from registration are also available under both Acts. 17 
The threshold issue of whether a note is subject to federal 
securities regulations can be crucial to a defrauded investor, as well 
as the alleged fraud perpetrator .18 Unless the instrument involved is 
a security, certain anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act are 
inapplicablel9 and no other federal regulation exists to determine 
liability.20 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (fundamental purpose of the Securities Acts 
was "to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market"); 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (central purpose of the 1934 
Act was to protect investors by requiring full disclosure from issuers of 
securities). 
16. The 1933 Act focuses on regulating public offerings of securities (the "primary 
market"). In contrast, the 1934 Act oversees trading on the "secondary market" 
by regulating those that are listed on national stock exchanges. HAMILTON, 
supra note 14, at 334-35 (1989). 
17. Small corporations strive to structure their capital-raising to take advantage of 
an exemption to the registration requirements, due to the expense and complex 
nature of filing. See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 335. 
18. For an investor it is somewhat easier to establish fraud under the civil liability 
provisions of the federal securities acts than under common law theories of 
fraud. See Comment, Notes as Securities; supra note 5, at 233 n.4; Sonnen-
schein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud 
Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1568 (1980) ("Parties seeking federal securities 
law jurisdiction in note cases do so primarily to avail themselves of the 
advantages afforded by the federal antifraud provisions as compared to rem-
edies provided by state commercial law, contract law, blue sky law, corporation 
law, or common law fraud actions. "). 
Additionally, an action under the securities regulations provides access to 
a federal forum. Possible advantages of the federal forum include more liberal 
discovery procedures and the possibility for judges and juries that may have a 
greater degree of sophistication, due to the location of federal courts in large 
urban areas. 
19. Although there are several anti-fraud provisions in the securities acts, the most 
frequently litigated provision is Rule IOb-5 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
78j (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter Rule lOb-51, which broadly prohibits 
employment of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities. See also infra note 33 for application of the 
anti-fraud provisions under the 1933 Act. 
20. See Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 234. Before 1975, the most 
distinctive advantage to pursuing a private right of action under Rule IOb-5 
was that a plaintiff's recovery did not depend upon proof of reliance or 
scienter. In 1976, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), established a requirement of scienter. See 
Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 234. Advantages of bringing 
suit under Rule IOb-5 are that: 1) the class of persons that may be sued is 
much broader than under a common law fraud action; 2) a plaintiff can obtain 
nationwide venue and service of process; and 3) shareholder derivative suits 
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B. Definition of Security 
The definitions of securities in the securities acts merely list 
general types of instruments that are considered securities. 21 Judicial 
interpretation is required when an instrument does not precisely match 
an item on the list.22 In fact, the problem of determining whether a 
particular instrument is a security is implied in Congress' inclusion 
of the phrase, "or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security," '23 at the end of the list of items in the 
definition. The use of this phrase has led courts to broadly construe 
the definition of a security. 24 Even though greater problems exist in 
using a broad (rather than a precise) definition,2s the Supreme Court 
has respected Congress' approach.26 
may be brought without providing security for the expenses of the defendant. 
[d. at 233 (citations omitted). 
In recent years, however, the requirements for successful civil liability 
actions under the anti-fraud provisions have been tightened by the Supreme 
Court. Currently, there are several requirements imposed for Rule IOb-5 private 
actions. For. example, the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of the 
company's stock during the time of non-disclosure. See Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). A material fact which was relied 
upon by the plaintiff must have been misstated or omitted by the defendant, 
although materiality and reliance may be proved by a "fraud on the market" 
theory. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988). Scienter or malicious 
intent on the part of defendant must be proved. See Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, i93 (1976). Also, the transaction must have involved 
manipulative or deceptive practices. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462, 473-74 (1977). 
21. See infra note 27 for the definitions of a security contained in the 1933 and 
the 1934 Acts. 
22. No actual test is provided in the statutory definitions, so the courts are left to 
establish their own criteria for determining whether an instrument falls within 
the definition of the statutes. 
23. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77(b)(I) & 78(c)(a)(IO) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
24. See Note, Definition of a Security: Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 40 Sw. 
L.J. 879, 881 (1986) (because Congress has failed to describe the characteristics 
that distinguish securities from nonsecurities, courts have fashioned their own 
concepts of what the definitions cover); see also Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. 
Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1063, (10th Cir. 1976) 
(definition of a security is to be liberally construed, with the courts looking to 
the substance rather than the form of the transaction), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 
965 (1977); Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852,854 (9th Cir. 1953) (definition 
of a security should not be narrowly construed), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 
(1954). . 
25. In recent years, federal courts have been inundated with securities litigation. 
See Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities, supra note 
7, at 402-03 n.17. This expanding caseload is a valid consideration when 
determining the scope of note transactions being defined as securities. See 
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Both Acts define "security" in a similarly broad manner. 27 In 
fact, the courts have consistently treated the definitions as substan-
tially identical. 28 There are, however, two differences in the Acts that 
relate to notes.29 First, the 1933 Act's definition includes the term 
Comment, The Status oj the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 175, 183 (1975). 
26. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990). This approach was 
adopted in an effort to ensure that both the SEC and the courts have sufficient 
flexibility to continue protection of investors through application of the secu-
rities laws to new instruments that may not be expressly listed in the statutory 
definition of a "security". Id. 
27. The 1933 Act's definition of a security states: 
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires -
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,· or other mineral 
rights, ... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, 
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 V.S.C.A. § 77b(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
The 1934 Act's definition of a security states: 
The term "security" means any note, stock, or treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certif-
icate of deposit, for a security, ... or in general, any instrument 
commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing; 
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, 
or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance 
of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any 
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited. 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(a)(1O) (West 1988 
& Supp. 1991). 
28. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 n.l; Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 
U.S. 681, 686 n.l (1985); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 776-
77 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th 
Cir. 1977); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (1Oth Cir. 1974); see also 
Sonnenschein, supra note 18, at 1573. But cj. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U.S. 551 (1982) (concluding that the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act did 
not cover a certificate of deposit and "unique agreement, negotiated one-on-
one by the parties," since these instruments were not considered securities). 
The Weaver Court, however, did not address the issue of whether it would 
reach the same conclusion when applying the 1933 Act definition of a security. 
29. See Sonnenschein, supra note 18, at 1572-73. 
1991] Reves v. Ernst & Young 525 
"evidence of indebtedness" which is not present in the 1934 Act. 30 
Second, the 1934 Act excludes from the 'definition of a security "any 
note ... which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding 
nine months ... ",31 whereas the 1933 Act definition includes such 
short-term notes, but exempts them from some of the more burden-
some regulations of the 1933 Act, such as registration.32 This exemp-
tion in the 1933 Act effectively provides the same type of exclusion 
of short-term notes as does the definitional section of the 1934 Act. 
The distinction between the exemption in the 1933 Act and the 
exclusion under the 1934 Act, however, is significant.33 
Determining whether a specific note is a security is more arduous 
than ascertaining whether stocks fall within the definition; the latter 
being instruments more readily identified as securities.34 Notes take 
on various forms based on the assorted types of transactions in which 
30. The significance of this technical difference is "probably negligible with respect 
to anti-fraud coverage." Sonnenschein, supra note 18, at 1573. The three 
reasons given for this conclusion are: 1) the definitions of security in the 1933 
and 1934 Acts are virtually identical according to Supreme Court; 2) since the 
majority of actions are brought under Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, parties 
would gain little by alleging the existence of an item which is not facially 
covered by the 1934 Act; and 3) the "evidence of indebtedness" language has 
been interpreted to provide equal statutory treatment for instruments which 
are deemed not to be notes. [d. 
31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(a)(10) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
32. The full text of § 3(a)(3) states: 
(a) Ex~ept as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this 
title shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities: 
(3) Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers' acceptance which 
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been 
or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity 
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of 
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise 
limited. 
For further discussion of the "maturity exception," see infra text accompanying 
notes 67-76. 
33. If an instrument is exempt under the 1933 Act from registration requirements, 
such a security would nonetheless remain subject to the anti-fraud provisions 
of the 1933 Act. See § 12(2) and § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 771(2) 
& 77q. If an instrument is excluded under the 1934 Act from the definition of 
a security, however, the instrument is not subject to any provisions (including 
the anti-fraud provisions) of the 1934 Act. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra 
note 14, § 4.04 at 64. 
34. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.01(1) at 48; Landreth Timber 
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1985) (traditional stock is more susceptible 
to a plain-meaning approach than notes). But see United Housing Found., Inc. 
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease 
an apartment in co-op were not considered to be securities since the shares did 
not meet the investment contract criteria found in SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 
293 (1946». 
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they are issued; consequently, they have been troublesome to cate-
gorize.35 Although not always agreeing as to the characterization of 
types of notes, most courts have concluded that there are some notes 
that definitely do not fit the "security" definition, such as notes 
securing home mortgages.36 
C. Two Problem Areas 
1. What Test Should be Applied to Notes? 
The federal courts' use. of a test by which notes should be 
characterized has varied over the years. 37 In cases decided before 
1971, courts usually held all note instruments to be securities without 
applying any specific test. 38 Recently, federal courts have applied as 
35. See, e.g., Smith Int'l., Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1201 
(5th Cir. 1988) (promissory notes issued by debtor corporation were not 
"securities" within meaning of federal securities laws, where notes were issued 
for corporation's pre-existing debt under financial restructuring plan); Union 
Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 884-85 (8th Cir. 
1986) (bank's 100070 participation in unsecured note held by another bank was 
not a "security" for purposes of federal securities law due to short-term 
nature); Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 493 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (note bearing fixed rate of interest and having only a one year term 
to maturity was a "security" within the meaning of federal law); Davis v. 
Avco Fin. Services, 739 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1984) (promissory notes 
executed to finance company by investors, evidencing loans to them by finance 
company, were not considered "securities" within the meaning of federal 
securities law), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985). See a/so Annotation, 
Promissory Notes as Securities, 39 A.L.R. FED. 357, 365 (1978) ("Transactions 
involving notes may generally be categorized as being either sales transactions 
or loan transactions. "). 
36. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of notes which 
the courts do not consider to be securities. 
37. Until the Reves decision, the Supreme Court had never specifically addressed 
the issue of what test should be utilized in determining which note transactions 
are securities. The federal courts applied several tests in order to comply with 
the general Supreme Court guidelines for defining securities. See infra notes 
38-66 and accompanying text. 
38. See Note, The Economic Rea/ities of Defining Notes as Securities, supra note 
7, at 406; see a/so Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 235. See, 
e.g., Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953) (promissory notes 
exchanged for funds to be bet on "fixed" volley ball game), cert. denied, 346 
U.S. 923 (1954); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (notes 
issued as loan to finance an expedition to retrieve "hidden monies"); Olympic 
Capital Corp. v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (personal note 
issued by individual on behalf of corporation to another corporation); SEC v. 
Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (notes as loan to fund mining 
operations); SEC v. Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958), afl'd per 
curiam, 283 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1960) (note issued by corporation to stock-
holders). 
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many as five different tests to analyze note transactions. The various 
tests include: 1) Howey test; 2) literal approach; 3) family resemblance 
test; 4) commercial/investment application; and 5) risk capital anal-
ysis. 
The Supreme Court first articulated the Howey test in the context 
of defining an "investment contract" in SEC v. W.J. Howey Com-
pany.39 Under this approach, substance overrides form and the cir-
cumstances of a transaction govern whether the transaction falls 
under the control of the securities acts.4O Viewing the "economic 
realities" of the transaction, the C~)Urt determined that the transac-
tions were "investment contracts" within the meaning of the Secu-
rities Acts41 because the scheme involved: 1) an investment of money, 
2) in a common enterprise42 , 3) where the investor is led to expect 
39. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, land sale contracts involving small portions 
of a citrus grove were sold to business professionals as investments. Optional 
service contracts were offered, (and accepted by a majority of the investors) 
whereby the land remained in the possession of the grower to manage, operate 
and control. The investors were solely dependent upon the efforts of the 
growers for any profits from the investment. Id. at 299-301. See also Note, 
The Continued Demise of the Howey Test: The Supreme Court Adopts the 
"Family Resemblance Test" for Identifying Notes as Securities, 20 STETSON L. 
REv. 613, 620-25 (1990) for a detailed discussion of the elements of the Howey 
test. 
40. See Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 240-41; Note, Federal 
Securities Laws Applicable to Sale of a Business Effectuated by a Stock Sale 
of All the Business's Stock, 15 U. BALT. L. REv. 310, 315 (1986). 
41. The term "investment contract" is included in the definition of a security 
under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 77(b)(I) & 78(c)(a)(IO). 
The Howey test was the first case to articulate a definition for the term 
"investment contract" and, thereby, expanded the federal securities laws to 
include instruments that had not currently been viewed to fall within the 
popular definition of a security. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 
(1946). 
42. The circuits are split as to the meaning of this test. See Cox, HILLMAN & 
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REOULAnoN 134 (1991). The two approaches include 
the "vertical" and "horizontal" commonality tests. The vertical commonality 
approach emphasizes the relationship between investors and the promoter. The 
principal inquiry is whether the profits of the investor are dependent upon the 
efforts of the promoter. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (fortunes of the investors were "inextricably tied to 
the efficacy" of the promoters, since the promoters provided scripts for the 
meetings to be conducted by investors and the guidelines on recruiting prospects 
and consummating a sale). 
On the other hand, the horizontal commonality approach emphasizes the 
relationship between the investors. This approach usually entails a pooling of 
investors' funds. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 682 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (court determined that pooling of 
investors' interests is essential factor,.to the finding of an investment contract), 
afl'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 3:"9 (1982); Hirk .v. Agri-Research Council, 
Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977) (discretionary trading account was 
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profits, 4) which come solely from the efforts of the promoter or a 
third party. 
The Howey test has been applied to many types of instruments.43 
In fact, the Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman44 
stated that the Howey test "embodies the essential attributes that 
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security. "45 Since 
the Forman case, the Eighth46 and the District of Columbia47 circuits 
have utilized the Howey test in analyzing note instruments. 
The Second Circuit developed the "literal approach"48 and the 
"family resemblance test. "49 The "literal approach" followed statu-
not considered an investment contract because there was no pooling of the 
funds of multiple investors). 
43. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (certificate of deposit 
and a business agreement between two families was not considered a security 
because the "unique agreement they negotiated was not designed to be traded 
publicly"); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (non-contributory, compulsory 
pension plan was not considered a security within the meaning of the securities 
acts since the employee was not found to have made an "investment" in the 
plan, but was merely "selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood"); 
Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(franchise agreement with agent to provide and maintain catalog store at 
agent's expense was not considered an investment contract since the franchisee's 
contributions significantly and substantially affected the profits expected from 
the enterprise); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th 
Cir. 1974) (sale of chinchillas involved the offering of investment contracts in 
violation of securities acts, even though investors nominally participated in the 
raising of the animals). 
44. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). In Forman, the Court determined that shares of stock 
entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-op City, a state subsidized, 
nonprofit housing cooperative, were securities within the meaning of the 
securities acts. 
45. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. 
46. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1988) (applied the 
Howey test and determined that Co-op demand notes did not fall under 
definition of security), rev'd sub nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 
(1990); Union Nat'l Bank v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 884-85 (8th Cir. 
1986) (since participating bank, although holding 100070 participation in unse-
cured note held by another bank, had no prospect of capital appreciation from 
any increased earnings in business of note's creator, the participation was not 
considered a "security"); Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d 1490 
(8th Cir. 1984) (loan participation interest was not a security within the meaning 
of the securities laws). . 
47. Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (short-
term promissory note given in exchange for funds advanced in anticipation of 
securing a limited partnership interest was considered a "security" due to the 
investment nature of the transaction). 
48. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(plaintiff gave long and short-term promissory notes in a financing arrangement 
for the purpose of acquiring defendant's optical business which the court 
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tory language closely, presuming all notes to be securities. This 
inflexible adherence to the literal language of the statute was at odds 
with Howey. As a result, the Supreme Court rejected the literal 
approach in the Forman decision.50 The Court insisted that the 
"economic realities" of each transaction be assessed in determining 
the status of a note. 51 
The Second Circuit then developed the "family resemblance test" 
in Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & CO. 52 This test attempted 
to account for the economic realities of the transaction while increas-
ing the predictability of whether the federal securities laws would 
apply to a particular instrument. Because of. the mandate by the 
Supreme Court in Forman that the economic realities of a transaction 
must be considered, the Second Circuit stated that some notes, such 
as those evidencing consumer financing or home mortgage notes, 
considered to be a sale of securities subject to securities regulation), a//'d per 
curiam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). The court reasoned: 
Upon turning to § 3(a)(l0) of the 1934 Act, however, we find that it 
provides, in unequivocal and all embracive language, that "[t]he term 
'security' means any note . ... " This plain language, literally read, 
clearly includes promissory notes of the type that are the subject of 
the present suit. 
Movie/ab, Inc., 321 F. Supp. at 808 (emphasis in original). 
49. See Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 
1137 (2d Cir. 1976) (unsecured, subordinated notes purchased by bank consid-
ered to be securities). 
50. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). The Court was faced with the problem of determining 
whether the purchase of shares of "stock" in a non-profit housing cooperative 
in New York City came within the definition of a security under the securities 
acts. The Supreme Court spurned the literal method and held that "the name 
given to an instrument was not dispositive." Id. at 850. The Court bolstered 
its decision by noting that the stock at issue lacked the attributes typically 
associated with stock. For example, the stock did not entitle the purchaser to 
anything more than a place to live, since the purpose was to provide the 
purchaser of the stock with living accommodations, not dividends or other 
benefits associated with the purchase of securities. Therefore, the Forman court 
determined that, even though the instrument was called "stock," it was not a 
security, within the meaning of the securities acts because it was purchased for 
consumption, not investment, purposes. 
51. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-50. In another decision, Zeller v. Bogue Elec. 
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), the 
Second Circuit viewed the economic realities of the transaction to determine 
the status of a demand note. The court retreated from the strict literal approach, 
due to the recent reversal by the Supreme Court on that issue and the fact 
that demand notes are not covered literally under the securities regulations. 
The Exchange court found that a collection of unsecured, subordinated notes 
purchased from a brokerage firm by a bank which had maturity dates ranging 
from twelve to eighteen months from issuance were considered to be within 
the definition of a "security" under the federal securities laws. Exchange, 544 
F.2d at 1138-39. 
52. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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would not be subject to federal securities regulation. s3 The court then. 
stated that "[w]hen a note does not bear a strong family resemblance 
to these examples and has a maturity exceeding nine months, § 1 O(b) 
[anti-fraud provisions] of the 1934 Act should generally be held to 
apply."s4 
The "commercial/investment" test is similar to the Howey test. ss 
The Federal Court of Appeals in the First,S6 Third,s, Fifth,s8 Seventh,S9 
Tenth,60 and Eleventh61 circuits have adopted this test. The "com-
53. See Exchange, 544 F.2d at 1138. See infra note 101 for all of the types of 
instruments, listed by the Exchange court, that are not considered to be 
securities within the meaning of the securities acts. 
54. Exchange, 544 F.2d at 1138. 
55. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 63; BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04, at 
56. 
56. See Futura Dev. Corp.· v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 41-42 (1st Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985) (a promissory note given after one-on-one business 
negotiations that resulted in an agreement to sell property was considered 
primarily a commercial, rather than investment, transaction because it served 
as substitute for purchase price and, therefore, was not subject to securities 
regulation). 
57. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir.) (general partnership 
interest in brokerage firm was not a "security" within the meaning of the 
Securities Acts), cerl. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (3d Cir. 1984); Lino v. City 
Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694-96 (3d Cir. 1973) (licensee issuing personal 
promissory notes for purchase of franchise arrangement was not considered to 
be security). 
58. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1201 (5th Cir. 
1988) (promissory notes issued for corporation's pre-existing debt under finan-
cial restructuring plan by debtor corporation were not securities within meaning 
of the securities acts, since neither notes nor pre-existing debt, which they 
represented, had any investment nature apart from debtor's obligation. to pay 
the specified interest and principal); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 
495 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1974) (notes issued to obtain bank loan were 
not considered securities since the notes were issued in the context of a 
commercial loan transaction). 
59. See Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 488-92 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (notes, bearing a fixed rate of interest and having a one-year term 
to maturity, were "securities" within the meaning of the securities acts, where 
the seller solicited members of the general public seeking passive return from 
their capital, sale of the notes did not resemble a commercial loan transaction, 
and in a series of communications, the seller referred to the note as an 
"investment"); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 465-66 (7th Cir. 
1981) (sale of all stock in a business was not considered to be the sale of a 
"security" for purposes of federal and state securities law); Lincoln Nat'l Bank 
v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1979) (promissory notes given in 
commercial loans were commercial rather than "investment" in character and, 
therefore, were not considered "securities" under the Securities Acts). 
60. See Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 779-83 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (passbook savings certificates and thrift certificates were considered 
to be investments through the character of the underlying transactions and 
were thus determined to be "securities"); Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 
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mercial/investment" test requires a note to have some investment 
characteristics. If the instrument has more of a "commercial" than 
"investment" nature, it will not be considered a security. Factors to 
consider in making this determination include: 1) the degree to which 
profit is in the hands of the maker rather than payee; 2) whether 
th~ purpose of the holder is to acquire interest in property or an 
enterprise; 3) whether note served as cash substitute for purchase 
price; and 4) whether the return on note was predetermined.62 
Another test frequently used in fixing the definition of a security 
is the "risk capital analysis," also known as the "corporate involve-
ment test." This test, like the Howey test, focuses on the relationship 
between the issuer of the note and the holder at the time the note 
is issued. For example, if the holder has incurred risk by contributing 
capital subject to the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others, 
that would indicate that the invested funds are "risk capital" and 
that the note in question is a security. 63 The Ninth Circuit developed 
the "risk capital" approach,64 which was adopted by the Fourth6S 
and Sixth66 Circuits. . 
672 (10th Cir. 1983) (shares in corporation which owned discotheque were not 
"securities" within meaning of securities law because shareholders were actively 
involved in operating and managing discotheque and thus their shares were 
not incidentals of an investment which derived profit from others). 
61. See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345-46 (lIth Cir. 1982) (the "economic 
realities" test is appropriate to determine whether transaction involving stock 
in corporation is "securities transaction" or an "investment contract" under 
federal securities laws). 
62. See Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centrex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985). 
63. See Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities, supra note 
7, at 414. 
64. Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, 583 F.2d 426, 431-34 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (promissory note and other documents given to lender for commercial 
construction loan to finance shopping center was not a security within the 
meaning of the federal securities laws since there was no investment of risk 
capital); United California Bank v. T.H.C. Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1358-
59 (9th Cir. 1977) (notes given bank by climate control subcontractor were not 
securities since the totality of the deal was considered to be low risk, notes 
had only one-month maturity and there was an absence of risk capital since 
risk was limited to that associated. with lending money); Great Western Bank 
& Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1976) (ten-month renewable 
note given to lender in connection with loan agreement did not constitute a 
security because the funding party did not invest "risk-capital"). 
65. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1989) (certificates of 
deposit issued by state-chartered savings and loan association in Maryland were 
not considered investments and, therefore, were not securities because the state 
had comprehensive regulatory system applicable to the association which limited 
risk associated with the transaction). 
Prior to the Tafflin decision, the Fourth Circuit had applied both the 
"literal approach" and the Howey test in determining whether an instrument 
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2. Does Maturity Exemption Apply to Demand Notes? 
As mentioned previously, both the 1933 and 1934 Acts have 
language which exempt notes possessing a short (less than nine 
months) maturity from some of the more rigorous regulatory pro-
visions of those Acts.67 The instruments listed in § 3(a)(IO) of the 
1934 Act, which are not considered securities if they have a maturity 
at the time of issuance not exceeding nine months, are currency, 
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and banker's acceptances. The 1933 
Act's short-term exemption, found in § 3(a)(3), lists the same instru-
ments, but differs from the 1934 Act language by adding that the 
instrument must "arise out of a current transaction or the proceeds 
. . . used for current transactions . . .. " The short-term nature of 
these instruments is regarded as being a sufficient safeguard to 
investors, making application of the securities acts superfluous.68 
Many of the federal circuit courts have agreed that the basic inquiry 
of whether a note instrument falls within the maturity exception is 
whether the note constitutes an investment, since Congress' intent 
was to protect investors from fraud. 69 
Traditionally, the SEC has narrowly construed the 1933 Act's 
exemption for short-term debt instruments.7o Using the legislative 
was a security under the federal securities definitions. See Occidental Life Ins. 
Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974) (sale of 
all outstanding stock of insurance company strongly presumed to be a sale of 
a security since the term "stock" is found within the literal definition of 
security); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1970) 
(sale of production payment, a financing device frequently used in oil and gas 
industry, was an investment contract and, therefore, considered a security under 
Securities Acts). 
66. See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 
651 F.2d 1174, 1179-81 (6th Cir. 1981) (loan participation agreement executed 
between a bank and another financial institution did not constitute a security 
under the "risk capital" test since it was characterized as a commercial loan 
and not an investment). The Union Planters court applied the "risk capital" 
test as a means of interpreting the economic reality factors of the Howey test. 
[d. at 1182. 
67. See supra notes 37-66 and accompanying text. 
68. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04[5] at 65. 
69. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 
1359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) ("The ultimate question is 
whether the plaintiffs are simply borrowers in a commercial transaction who 
are not protected by the 1934 Act or investors in a securities transaction who 
are protected."); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975) (in order that investors might be 
protected, only promissory notes that are investments fall within the maturity 
exception); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.) (the 
investment or commercial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability 
of the Act), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). 
70. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 65-66. 
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history of § 3(a)(3), the SEC has interpreted the maturity exemption 
to apply only to: 
prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not 
ordinarily purchased by the general public .... [and] issued 
to facilitate well-recognized types of current operational 
business requirements .... "71 
Commercial paper is designed to finance the short-term72 credit needs 
of large corporations or banks.73 As such, this instrument is usually 
issued by only top-rated74 entities and purchased with large amounts 
of cash by only sophisticated investors. Therefore, regulation of these 
instruments has been considered unnecessary by Congress and the 
SEC. Although neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act contain the 
term "commercial paper, "7S the federal circuit courts have generally . 
followed the SEC's interpretation.76 
D. Blue Sky Laws 
The issue of determining whether notes are securities and the 
application of the maturity. exemption to demand notes have also 
arisen in the context of state securities acts (or "blue sky laws").77 
For example, each state has enacted its own definition of a security. 78 
71. [d. (quoting Sec. Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) , 2045). 
72. The maturities for commercial paper typically range from 2 to 270 days. See 
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 68. 
73. [d. 
74. Both Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's Corporation assign 
ratings to commercial paper issuers. [d. 
75. However, the 1933 Act states that, for the exemption to apply, the note must 
"arise[] out of a current transaction." Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S~C.A. § 
77c (1988). This wording, which does not appear in the 1934 Act, could be 
interpreted to refer to commercial paper. 
76. See, e.g., Holloway v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772,778 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 775-77 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 
800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & 
Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir .), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972). See 
also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74-75 (Stevens, J., concurring); 
BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 66. 
77. See supra note 14. 
78. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (Deering 1968 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 7302(13) (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 517.02(17) (1987 & Supp. t"991); 
70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-102(t) (1992). However, the Uniform Securities 
Act aided in the standardization of state securities regulation. See 1 Blue Sky 
L. Rep. (CCH) , 5601 for text of Uniform Securities Act. Regional variations 
existed in blue sky laws which led to the drafting of the Uniform Securities 
Act in the 1950's. See BLooMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, at § 4.04 at 64. 
Presently, thirty-seven jurisdictions, including Maryland, have adopted the 
Uniform Securities Act. [d. 
534 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 20 
However, the definition of a security under many state statutes closely 
parallels that found in the federal securities acts.79 Both state and 
federal courts in Maryland, for example, have found that the defi-
nition of a security under the Maryland Act is identical to the 
definition found under the federal securities acts.80 
The Maryland Act also contains an exemption for short-term 
securities which combines the wording of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, 
but specifically limits the exemption to commercial paper. 81 Before 
the Reves decision, no Maryland state court82 had specifically dealt 
with the question of whether demand or promissory notes were 
considered securities under the Maryland Act. But an Attorney 
General's Opinion83 had concluded that certain promissory notes were 
considered securities because the notes did not constitute commercial 
paper and, hence, the Maryland short-term maturity exemption was 
not applicable. 84 Recently, using the Reves criteria, the Court of 
79. Compare 1933 Act § 3(a)(10) with MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601 
(1985 & Supp. 1992) and Uniform Securities Act § 402(a) (contained in I Blue 
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 5601). 
80. See O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Md. 1982). The Maryland 
Securities Act is codified as MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11 (1985 & 
Supp. 1990) [hereinafter cited as the Maryland Act). For a discussion of the 
history of the Maryland Act, see Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 400 
A.2d 455 (1979). The Maryland Act defines a "security" at § 11-101(P) and 
lists exempt securities at § 11-601. 
81. Section 11-601(10) of the Maryland Act states: 
The following securities are exempted from §§ 11-205 and 11-501 of 
this title: 
(10) Any commercial paper which arises out of a current transaction 
or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current 
transactions and which evidences an obligation to pay cash within 
nine months of the date of issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or 
any renewal of such paper which is likewise limited, or any guarantee 
of such paper or of any such renewal. 
MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601(10) (1985 & Supp. 1990). 
82. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland specifically addressed the 
question of whether a promissory note is a "security" under the securities laws 
in Oliver v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1977). In Oliver, the district 
court held that a promissory note issued by the defendant in exchange for the 
purchase of the plaintiff's stock was not an "investment." The court found 
that the defendant was attempting to divest himself of his interest in the 
business and was not "investing" by acquiring the promissory notes. Conse-
quently, the note was not considered a "security" within the meaning of the 
Securities Acts. Oliver, 426 F. Supp. at 1087. 
83. See 57 Op. Att'y Gen. 377 (1972) (stating that promissory notes do not, per 
se, fall within the exemption provided for short-term securities in the Maryland 
Act). 
84. Several commentaries have been written on the subject of determining whether 
notes are securities under the Maryland Act. See generally Comment, Municipal 
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Appeals of Maryland held that promissory notes issued by a non-
profit corporation were considered securities under the Maryland 
Securities Act. 8S 
III. FACTS OF THE REVES CASE 
The Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc. 
("Co-op") raised operating funds by selling promissory notes instead 
of obtaining funds from traditional borrowing sources such as banks.86 
This "Investment Program" was offered to members of the Co-op 
and the general public through advertisements in the Co-op's news-
letter.87 Purchasers exchanged cash for promissory notes, which were 
payable on demand and offered higher interest rates that those paid 
by local financial institutions. 88 
Although Co-op advertised its note to prospective purchasers as 
"Safe . . . Secure . . . and available when you need it, "89 it filed a 
petition for bankruptcy in 1984.90 A class consisting of note holders 
filed suit against Arthur Young & Co. (the predecessor of Ernst &. 
Young), auditors of the Co-op's 1981 and 1982 financial statements, 
charging that the auditors had "intentionally failed to follow gen-
erally accepted accounting principles in its audit. "91 The class alleged 
that these demand notes constituted securities and sought recovery 
through the anti-fraud provisions of both federal92 and state law.93 
Securities and State Securities Laws: A New Look, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 558 
(1984); Comment, Blue Sky Law & Practice: An Overview, 4 U. BALT. L. 
REv. 1 (1974); Comment, A Prospectus on Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD. 
L. REv. 289 (1963). 
85. Caucus Distributors, Inc. v. Maryland Securities Commissioner, 320 Md. 313, 
577 A.2d 783 (1990). The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that: 1) 
the investment was essentially motivated by the expected profit to be generated 
from the notes; 2) the plan of distribution of the instrument existed in a 
ci. ::umstance of common trading for speculation or investment; 3) a reasonable 
public expectation existed that the notes were securities and 4) there was a lack 
of another regulatory scheme that would reduce risk in acquiring the notes. 
Caucus, 320 Md. at 326-29, 557 A.2d at 789-91. 
86. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 53 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub 
nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 V.S. 56 (1990). 
87. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 59 (1990). 
88. The rate of interest changed periodically, but those changes were announced 
in Co-op's newsletters. Arthur Young, 856 F.2d at 53. 
89. Reves, 494 U.S. at 59. 
90. Id. The value of the notes at the time of bankruptcy totaled over $10 million. 
Id. 
91. Id. 
92. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); 15 V.S.C.A. § 78j (West 1988 
& Supp. 1991). 
93. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-42-106 (1990). 
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At trial, the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Arkansas determined that the demand notes were secu'rities under 
both federal and state law and awarded the class a $6.1 million 
judgment. 94 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the demand notes 
were not securities, under federal law because they failed the Howey 
test, nor were they securities under state law because the "demand 
nature of the notes is very uncharacteristic of a security. "9S The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari "to address the federal issue" and 
reversed the Eighth Circuit. 96 
IV. HOLDING OF THE REVES CASE 
A. Test Applied to Notes 
The Supreme Court held that the demand notes issued by the 
Co-op were securities. In making this determination the, plurality 
adopted the Second Circuit's "family resemblance" test because it 
"provide[d] a more promising framework for analysis" than the 
"investment versus commercial" test.97 The Court tejected the Howey 
test because it merely determined whether an instrument was an 
"investment contract," which is an inappropriate measure for notes. 98 
Under the "family resemblance" test adopted by the Court, a 
rebuttable presumption99 exists that a note is a security.lOo This 
presumption may be rebutted by proof that either the note resembles 
an instrument considered a non-securitylOl or that the note possesses 
94. Robertson v. White, 653 F. Supp. 851, 852 (W .0. Ark. 1986), rev'd sub nom. 
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. 
Reves v. Ernst & Young,494 U.S. 56 (1990). 
95. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 55 (1988), rev'd sub nom. Reves 
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). 
96. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 59-60 (1990). 
97. [d. at 65. 
98. However, this rationale seems to be a departure from the Court's earlier 
statement that the Howey test "embodies the essential attributes that run 
through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." Forman, 421 U.S. at 
852. See infra notes 137-142 and accompanying text for discussion of the 
Court's analysis on this issue. 
99. [d. at 63 n.2, discusses the Second Circuit's interpretation of the "family 
resemblance" test. The test limited the presumption of notes as securities to 
only notes with a term of more than nine months. If a security had a term of 
less than nine months, it was not considered to be a "security." This inter-
pretation was apparently based on the statutory exclusion for notes with a 
maturity of less than nine months found in § 3(a)(I0) of the 1934 Act. [d. 
100. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64. 
101. In Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 
1976), and Chemical ,Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984), the courts list several examples of 
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the characteristics of anon-security .102 Applying this test to the Co-
op's notes, the Court concluded that they did not bear a "family 
resemblance" to a non-security; therefore, they retained the pre-
sumption of being securities.103 
Bringing greater certainty to application of the "family resem-
blance" test, the Reves Court adopted four factors that characterize 
securities. 104 The first factor is the motivation of the sellers and 
buyers of a note. If the seller's purpose is to raise money for the 
general use of a business enterprise and the buyer's interest is 
primarily in the profit to be generated by the note, then the instru-
ment is likely to be considered a security. If, on the other hand, the 
note is sold to aid in the purchase of a specific asset for commercial 
use or a consumer good (such as a residence), the note is not 
considered a security. The Court determined that only "investment-
for-profit" motives would result in the investment being deemed a 
security. The second factor is the "plan of distribution." An instru-
ment would not be a security if the "plan of distribution" does not 
include common trading for speculation or investment. Even if the 
notes are not traded on an exchange, the Court determined that 
instruments offered or sold to a "broad segment of the public" will 
satisfy the common trading element. los The reasonable expectations 
of the investing public constitutes the third factor. In order for a 
note not to be characterized as a security, the public must not be 
led to believe that the note is a security. The last factor is whether 
there exists an alternative regulatory scheme. If there is such a scheme 
which significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, the note is not 
considered a security.l06 If, upon evaluation of these four factors, 
notes that are "non-securities." The list includes notes evidencing consumer 
financing, home mortgages, or "character" loans to bank customers; short-
term notes secured by a lien on a small business or an assignment of accounts 
receivable; notes which formalize an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary 
course of business; and loans by commercial banks for current operations. In 
deciding whether another category should be added to the list of "non-
securities," courts should compare the characteristics of the questioned instru-
ment to the four factors applied by the court in determining whether a 
transaction involves a "security." Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 939. 
102. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
103. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67. 
104. [d. at 67-69. 
105. [d. This factor does not mean that the instrument must be traded on an 
exchange. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 59. The Supreme 
Court cited SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), which 
involved an investment contract for oil and gas leases. In citing this case, the 
Reves court implied- that an instrument did not have .to be traded on an 
exchange in order to be "commonly traded." [d. 
106. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (certificates of deposit 
issued were not considered to be securities, since they were insured by the 
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the note in question bears a family resemblance to something which 
is not a security, then the note is exempt from securities regulation. I07 
The Co-op demand notes were examined in light of the four 
factors to determine their "family resemblance." First, the Court 
found the notes were sold in an effort to raise capital and were 
purchased in order to earn interest. 108 This parallelled the "invest-
ment-for-profit" scenario which was considered to be characteristic 
of a security.l09 Second, as to the plan of distribution, the demand 
notes were not traded on an exchange, but over an extended period 
of time to a broad segment of the public. Such a plan of distribution 
was held to be all that was necessary to establish the requisite 
"common trading" of the instrument, which is indicative of a 
security. Third, the public's reasonable perception of the notes in-
dicated that they were securities. IIO The notes were considered secu-
rities because the Court found persuasive the evidence that the Co-
op characterized the notes to prospective purchasers as investments. 
The Court determined that the public's usual understanding of a 
note is that it is a security or investment. 11I Lastly, the Court found 
no risk-reducing factors, such as the existence of an alternative 
regulatory scheme, which would avoid the need for federal regula-
tion. 1I2 
B. Application of Maturity Exception 
1. Plurality Opinion 
While the entire Court agreed upon the formulation and appli-
cation of the "family resemblance" test,1I3 there was divergence of 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and subject to substantial federal bank-
ing regulations). 
107. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67. 
108. [d. at 67-68. 
109. [d. at 68. 
110. [d. at 69. 
III. Generally, this factor presents a much more complicated scenario. See generally 
BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 61 ("A securities law professor 
would recognize that the sale of orange groves, chinchillas and the like under 
circumstances involving an investment contract is a security and expect to 
receive a prospectus, but would the average investor to whom securities of this 
nature are offered?"). 
112. The notes were uncollateralized, uninsured and, unlike the certificates of deposit 
in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), were not insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Reves, 494 U.S. at 69. 
113. Both the majority and the dissent agree that the test to be applied for 
determining whether a note is a "security" is the "family resemblance" test. 
See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-65 and 77. 
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opmlOn about the application of the maturity exception to the 
demand notes. The plurality concluded that the statutory exemption 
for notes with maturities of less than nine months did not apply to 
the Co-op's demand notes. Rejecting the dissent's interpretationll4 of 
the immediate maturity of the demand notes, the plurality found the 
dissent's conclusion to be incorrectly based on state liS rather than 
federal law. The plurality determined that state law cannot be used 
to determine a federal question,II6 and that allowing state law to 
define a note's maturity would nullify Congress' intent that there be 
consistent application of the securities laws. The plurality reasoned 
that even if literal effect were given to the words of the maturity 
exception, the Co-op's demand notes did not fall within the statute's 
terms because "demand notes do not necessarily have short terms."JJ1 
The Court explained a demand could be made on a demand note 
immediately or it could be made long after nine months. liS 
Because of this ambiguity, the plurality interpreted the exclusion 
in accordance with the statute's purpose. 1I9 The plurality stated that 
Congress' purpose in the securities acts was to ensure that invest-
ments, unless specifically excluded, were to be regulated by the 
114. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's 
rationale. 
115. Arkansas' statute of limitations law deems a demand note to be immediately 
due such that an action can be brought at any time without any other demand 
than the suit. Reves, 494 U.S. at 71-72. The plurality rejected the Co-op's 
argument that the demand notes fall within the "plain words" of the securities 
exemption because the argument was based on Arkansas' statute of limitations 
laws. Id. at 72-73. 
116. Reves, 494 U.S. at 72. But see, Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595, 598-99 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (discussed supra note 65). 
117. Reves, 494 U.S. at 72. The majority determined that "maturity" could be 
defined as being immediate, because demand could be made immediately. 
118. Id. Maturity could be viewed as being longer than nine months, since demand 
could be made many months into the future. 
119. Several circuit courts have reasoned that demand notes do not fall under the 
short-term exemptions of the Securities Acts. See, e.g., Holloway v. Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485, 1488-89 (10th Cir.) (relying on 
legislative history, the court held exception in statutory definition for short-
term notes is limited to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type 
not ordinarily purchased by the general public), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 386 
(1990); Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 492 n.l 
(7th Cir. 1984) (generally, a demand note does not fall under the short-term 
exemption of the Securities Acts); SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 
529, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (notes with maturities of only three or six months, 
sold by defendants pursuant to their commercial paper program to small 
investors, were not considered exempt from registration under the short-term 
exception of the Securities Act); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 
770, 777-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (promissory note given in exchange for funds 
advanced in anticipation of securing a limited partnership interest constituted 
a "security," even though it was less than nine months' duration). 
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securities acts. It then held that the Co-op notes did not specifically 
fall within the maturity exclusion and, therefore, should be regulated 
as securities. 120 
2. Concurring Opinion 
Justice Stevens' concurring opInIOn followed the plurality in 
finding that the maturity exception did not apply to the demand 
notes, but his reasoning was based on the unanimous rejection of a 
literal reading of the maturity exception by the lower federal courts. 121 
Justice Stevens noted that the courts of appeals have historically 
. interpreted the maturity exceptions to include only commercial paper 
and not investment securities. l22 Justice Stevens concluded that if all 
circuits agreed that the maturity exception was reserved for only 
commercial paper, it was for Congress, not the Supreme Court, to 
disturb this settled construction.12l• 
3. Dissenting Opinion 
The four dissenters l24 believed the Co-op's demand notes fell 
within the short-term maturity exclusion of § 3(a)(1O) and, therefore, 
should not be considered securities. 12s The dissent's conclusion was 
based on the common understanding of a demand note's maturity. 
Relying on legal dictionaries, treatises and case law, the dissent found 
a consensus that a note payable upon demand was considered to be 
immediately due. 126 This being the case, the dissent determined that 
demand notes would fall within the maturity exception, since their 
maturity would be, by definition, less than nine months. 
The dissent applied statutory construction and "well settled state 
law" in formulating its opinion. 127 It maintained that the terms 
"note" and "maturity" have been "terms of art in the legal profes-
sion for centuries" and that in construing these terms, the "common 
understanding of those terms at the time of the statute's creation" 
should be used. 128 The fact that the vast majority of state courts 
adopted the view of the immediate maturity of demand notes is 
persuasive support for the dissent's reasoning. 129 
120. Id. at 73. 
121. Reves, 494 U.S. at 73-74 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
122. Id. at 74. 
123. Id. 
124. The Justices in dissent included: Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia. 
125. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 76-82 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
126. Id. at 76-78. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 77. 
129. The dissent contends that "[w]elI settled state law can inform our understanding 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court has failed to establish predictability in 
determining whether demand notes are securities. Reves has contrib-
uted not only to the uncertainty which issuers of demand notes face, 
but also to that entailed in interpreting the maturity exceptioIls130 of 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Unfortunately, it appears .that too much 
attention was placed on the outcome particular to this case and not 
enough attention was placed on articulating tests which could be 
consistently applied to arrive at proper outcomes in the future. 
A. Likely Problems in the Application of the New Test 
In choosing the "family resemblance" test, the Supreme Court 
furnished an all encompassing method for determining if a note falls 
outside the securities regulations. Not only did the Court adopt a 
list of instruments that are to be considered non-securities, but it 
also allowed for expansion of the list if instruments meet the four-
factor test. In choosing a new test, however, the Court created new 
problems of interpretation for courts attempting to apply the Reves 
decision. 
A potential difficulty for courts that apply the Reves decision is 
determining the weight to assign each of the four factors described 
by the Court. J3J Because it used the qualifying terms "strong resem-
blance" and "sufficiently similar, "132 the Court probably would not 
require each of the four factors to be present for a note instrument 
to be considered anon-security. 133 The Reves Court, however, failed 
to determine the status of a note instrument that possesses some, 
but not all of the factors. If all of the factors are not required for 
a note to bear a resemblance to something which is not a security, 
then which of the four factors must be present in order to come to 
this conclusion? 
of what Congress had in mind when it employed a term it did not define." 
Reves, 494 U.S. at 79 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989» (since no definition existed in the statute, the 
domicile status of twin babies born off the reservation was determined using 
Congressional intent for the word "domicile," which was considered federal 
and not state in nature). 
130. The terms "maturity exclusion," "maturity exemption" or "maturity excep-
tion" are used interchangeably and refer to both § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act and 
§ 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text for 
explanation of these statutes. 
131. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 62. 
132. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67. 
133. But, it is important to keep in mind that the Reves Court found that the Co-
op's notes satisfied all of the factors presented. 
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B. Similarity to Old Test 
Reves' rejection of the Howey test is unfounded. The Court 
reasoned that relying on the same test for analyzing notes as the test 
used to analyze investment contracts would "make the Acts' enu-
meration of many types of instruments superfluous."134 The terms 
"investment contracts" and "notes," however, are both listed as 
separate instruments in the definition of security under the 1933 and 
1934 Acts. This fact merely indicates "that the tests for the two 
instruments need not be the same, not that they cannot be the 
same. "135 Notes and investment contracts could both be viewed as 
types of contracts.136 
The rejection of the Howey test is surprising in light of the 
similarity between the Howey test and the family resemblance test. 
The instructional factors added by the Court to the "family resem-
blance" test are surprisingly similar to the elements of the Howey 
test. The first factor in the Reves test questions whether the parties 
are seeking an investment from their outlay of funds or if there is 
another (commercial) purpose. The first element of the Howey test 
also asks if the purchaser of the instrument is seeking an investment 
through the outlay of money. 137 
The second factor of the Reves test requires a common trading 
of the instrument or, as the Court found in Reves, distribution to a 
broad segment of the public. This sounds similar to the second 
element of the Howey test which requires a common enterprise. Both 
factors involve offers or sales to a broad segment of the public. 
The third Reves factor involves the reasonable expectation of 
the public that the notes are investments. This factor relates to the 
first and third prongs of the Howey test. Under the Howey test, if 
a purchaser of an instrument views the transaction as an investment, 
in that they are expecting profits, the first and third prongs would 
be met. 
Although the Howey te~t does not contain a prong which looks 
to whether an alternative regulatory scheme exists to protect the 
investor, the Supreme Court has applied this test in several cases 
where the Howey test was also applied. 138 The reasoning is that the 
134. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 
681, 692 (1985». 
135. Gordon, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 
TEX. L. REv. 383, 390 (1990) (emphasis in original). 
136. A major difference between the two types of instruments is that notes usually 
pay a fixed rate of interest and investment contracts usually do not. Id. 
137. See supra notes 39-42 for explanation of the Howey test. 
138. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (presence of ERISA "severely 
undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, 
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alternative regulation renders the protection of the Acts less necessary. 
The only element of the Howey test not specifically mentioned 
in the Reves test was the need for the profits to be obtained "solely 
from the efforts of others." But, this test is inherent in the nature 
of promissory notes. The purchaser of a promissory note can only 
receive a return through the efforts of the seller of the note, when 
the purchaser is paid the interest due. Overall, the elements of the 
two tests appear to be the same. 
Because the elements of the new test are essentially identical to 
the elements of the Howey test, the Reves court could have used the 
Howey test and avoided articulating a new test. The "family resem-
blance" test, as applied by the Reves court, consists of new, unin-
terpreted language. The Howey test has been applied for several 
years and requires less interpretation. There appears to have been 
little consistency gained, but much confusion added by applying a 
new test when the Howey test was suitable. 
c. Application of Maturity Exemption to Demand Notes 
The second issue in the Reves decision which raised more ques-
tions than it answered was the plurality's interpretation of the ma-
turity of the Co-op's demand notes. Relying on the interpretation 
that Congress intended to protect the public through regulating 
investments,139 the Court held that the short-term exception of the 
Securities Acts did not cover the Co-op's demand notes. However, 
this interpretation of the maturity exclusion raises the question of 
how to determine when a demand note's maturity is short-term (less 
than nine months). 
The Reves decision bequeaths a strong presumption that notes 
are securities, since it fails to specify guidelines for determining when 
the maturity exception applies. The plurality criticized the dissent for 
applying state law, rather than federal law, to determine the maturity 
of a note, because of the possibility of differing results in each 
state. l40 However, the plurality did not specify what criteria should 
compulsory pension plans"); Marine Bank v. Webster, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) 
(since certificate of deposit insured by the FDIC, it is unnecessary to subject 
issuers to liability under Securities Acts). 
139. As stated previously, the Court's interpretation of Congressional intent in 
enacting a sufficiently broad definition of "security" was "to encompass 
virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment." Reves, 494 U.S. 
at 61. The broad scope of the security definition was used to eliminate serious 
abuses in a largely unregulated securities market and provide the widest 
protection possible for the public. [d. at n.l (quoting United Housing Found., 
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975». 
140. Reves, 494 U.S. at 71. 
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be applied to determine whether a particular note would be "short-
term" under jederallaw. 
The only guidance offered is the list of instruments specified as 
falling within the short-term maturity exclusion of the statutes. 141 But 
just as in the case of the Reves demand notes, it may not be clear 
whether the instrument matches the Court's list. There is no longer 
an implicit understanding of the phrase "short-term." To further 
complicate the issue, the common understanding of an instrument 
may be overcome by public policy considerations to protect inves-
tors.142 Any legitimate exemption from the securities' regulation is, 
therefore, more difficult to determine. 
Some guidance might have been provided in the last sentence of 
the plurality's opinion, which suggested that the intent of the parties 
be examined. 143 But such a suggestion, without more explicit instruc-
tion, only causes additional confusion. The Co-op's demand notes 
were not considered to have an immediate maturity, presumably 
because the Court determined that the parties did not contemplate 
that demand would be made within nine months. The question then 
becomes how to determine a party's state of mind. l44 Should each 
purchaser's intent be scrutinized individually or, if sold to a broad 
segment of the public, should a "collective state of mind" be 
assessed?14S 
Even if intent can be proved, an agreement between the parties 
might preclude application of the Securities Acts entirely. To have 
the short-term maturity exemption apply, it must be precisely in-
voked. It appears that the Court would require that the maturity of 
the note be written into the instrument or that both parties contem-
plate demand be made within the statutory period. l46 In Marine Bank 
v. Weaver,147 however, the Court concluded that the certificate of 
deposit given for a promise to pay a percentage of profits was a 
"unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the parties" and was 
not considered a security. Therefore, this type of "limited" arrange-
ment would not fit the definition of a security, since it would not, 
141. See supra note 11 for text of short-term maturity exemption of the 1933 Act. 
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text for discussion of investor protection 
rationale of Securities Acts. 
143. The sentence states: 
"[a]lthough the result might be different if the design of the trans-
action suggested that both parties contemplated that demand would 
be made within the statutory period, that is not the case before us." 
Reves, 494 V.S. at 73. Since this statement goes beyond the facts before the 
Court, it would be considered dictum. 
144. See COX ET AL., supra note 42, at 207. 
145. Id. 
146. Reves, 494 V.S. at 73. 
147. 455 V.S. 551 (1982). 
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be a "common enterprise," under the Howey test, or "commonly 
traded," as required by the Reves test. 
Although attempting to merely narrow the scope of the short-
term maturity exception, the Reves opinion leads to an extreme 
position-either completely constricting or expanding the breadth of 
the exception. On one hand, Reves could be interpreted to have 
narrowed the maturity exception without disregarding it completely. 148 
Complete dismantling of the maturity exception did not appear to 
be the Reves Court's intent. In light of the significance the plurality 
placed on protection of investors, however, if a situation arose where 
the short-term nature of the instrument was not a sufficient safeguard 
against unscrupulous activity, the Court might well disregard the 
maturity exception, in favor of the ultimate purpose of the Securities 
Act. 149 Also, lack of guidance on how intent is to be proved, coupled 
with the difficulty in proving intent, is likely to preclude any notes 
from falling within the maturity exception. 
At the other extreme, the short-term maturity exception could 
be applied to all demand notes. There is no prohibition which would 
prevent circuit courts from creating an administrative rule of con-
venience that would view all demand notes as short-term, absent 
evidence of intent to the contrary. 
VI. IMPACT 
Lack of clarity in the opInIOn defeats the Court's efforts to 
create uniformity. The Reves court was faced with choosing between 
a bright-line or a flexible rule when establishing the tests to be 
148. Some circuit courts have also applied a narrow construction of the maturity 
exemption. See, e.g., Zabriski v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (lOth Cir. 1974) 
(maturity exceptions are limited to only prime quality negotiable commercial 
paper of the type not ordinarily purchased by the general public); SEC v. 
Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 524 (5th Cir. 1974) (a literal 
reading of the definition of "security" is compatible with the policy of strictly 
construing exemptions from the coverage of the Acts); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. 
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799-800 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 409 U.S. 1009 
(l972) (the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does 
not take it out of the securities acts, unless the note fits into the general 
category of "commercial paper"). 
149. The prefatory language in § 2 of the 1933 Act and § 3 of the 1934 Act would 
likely be used to arrive at this conclusion. As Justice Stevens eloquently stated 
in his concurring opinion: 
[p]ursuant to that language, definitions specified by the Acts may not 
apply if the 'context otherwise requires .... ' The context clause thus 
permits a judicial construction of the statute which harmonizes the 
facially rigid terms of the 9-month exclusion with the evident intent 
of Congress. 
Reves, 494 U.S. at 75-76 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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applied to note transactions. A bright-line rule would have been easy 
to apply, but may not have consistently and accurately fulfilled 
congressional intent in each situation. On the other hand, a flexible 
rule, designed to consider the individual facts of each situation lacks 
clarity. ISO Each strategy has its strengths and weaknesses, but choosing 
one or the other adds predictability to courts attempting to apply a 
given test .. Unfortunately, it appears the Reves court did not choose 
either option, thereby bestowing ineffective standards. 
The Reves test does not create a simple analysis. By creating a 
new test for determining whether a note instrument is a security, 
without providing more detail in how the factors are to be applied, 
the test has little predictive value. The same criticism applies which 
respect to the lack of specificity revealed for determining whether a 
note has a short-term maturity. Predictability of the legal conse-
quences of a company's actions is important in the context of capital 
raising by firms. Not knowing legal consequences flowing from 
issuance of a financial instrument will increase the costs of issuing 
such notes, as issuers seek to account for the uncertain, but potential, 
risks of misinterpretation. Knowing the bounds within which a note 
will be scrutinized would reduce uncertainty, and allow financial 
instruments to reflect true and known costs. 
Even if any stability can be gleaned from this decision for the 
business community, the decision will likely result in less flexibility 
and more litigation for the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the courts. lSI It is likely that investment schemes can be devised that 
could be limited in maturity to less than nine months and relate to 
current transactions. Under the Reves decision, these schemes would 
be exempt from federal securities regulation. Absent additional guid-
ance in subsequent Supreme Court case law, the Reves court has 
created a situation that Congress will need to resolve. Removing the 
exemption for short-term securities altogether, or specifically limiting 
the exemption to a particular class of instruments, such as high-
grade commercial paper, IS2 are possible solutions. 
150. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 n.2. 
151. As the Court commented, an approach founded upon something other than a 
per se rule is subject to criticism for lack of clarity. However, this type of 
approach has the corresponding advantage of allowing the SEC and the courts 
flexibility in clarifying any ambiguity. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 n.2. The more 
rigid a rule, the less flexible the interpretation. 
152. Even though the term "commercial paper" is not used in either the 1933 nor 
1934 Act's "short-term" exemption/exclusion, both the SEC and federal circuit 
courts have regarded commercial paper as the only instrument to which the 
"short-term" legislation would apply. See BLoOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 
14, § 4.04[5] at 65-66. The Commission has stated: 
The legislative history of the Act makes clear that Section 3(a)(3) 
applies only to (1) prime quality negotiable commercial paper, (2) of 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In its haste to provide investor protection, the Court has artic-
ulated hollow tests. The Reves court has left too much discretion 
with the circuit courts. This discretion could be productive, if con-
tained within a flexible framework which the lower courts are com-
fortable in applying. Such a flexible framework is the Howey test. 
But the Reves court chose to articulate a new test, which requires 
new interpretation of factors. 
Even if some clarity has been contributed by the factors, the 
effort required to apply them outweighs the possible benefits. Al-
though inconsistency within the federal courts in determining whether 
a note should be considered a security within the securities acts, has 
been reduced by the Reves decision, it has not been eliminated. 
Furthermore, the debate over how to determine the maturity of a 
demand note has not been quelled, but intensified. The standards 
suggested by the plurality for classification of a note under the 
maturity exception are far from definite. In fact, this· procedure 
leaves the investing public, as well as the courts, with indefinite 
criteria that had been previously rejected by the Supreme Court as 
"not articulating a meaningful distinction between notes that the Act 
purportedly covers and those it does not. "IS3 Overall, the Reves 
decision has not clarified, but only added to the controversy. 
Sheryl N. Stephenson 
a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, (3) 
paper issued to facilitate well-recognized types of current operational 
business requirements and (4) of a type eligible for discounting by 
Federal Reserve banks. 
Id. (quoting Sec. Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 1 2045). 
153. BLOOMENTHAL & WINO, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 50, (quoting Securities Indus. 
Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bd., 468 U.S. 137, 152 (1984». 
